



Module Three

Capstone Project

Developing a Resilient National Security Capability

By

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Declaration of Academic Ownership

I, Tim Howard hereby declare that the coursework submitted in this document is my own unaided work and is free from any form of plagiarism.

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Date: 06 August 2024

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3.1 Introduction

This submission outlines the development of a new strategic capability for the Cayman Islands Regiment. Despite being resourced for humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) activity, the analysis conducted in modules one and two highlighted a critical gap in operational capacity. As a military organisation and with a legal mandate for the defence and security of the islands, the Regiment has no such capability.

This submission therefore outlines and asserts the development of a nascent security capability organic to the Regiment, that is able to add significant resilience to the national security framework.

This innovative organisational concept will fundamentally change and redefine the organisational mission and culture, thrusting the Regiment into an altogether new operating environment; aligning it more with traditional Defence Forces, rather than non-government or humanitarian organisations. It will necessitate, amongst other things, substantial investment, an aggressive recruitment strategy, a new organisational structure, new training programmes and, above all else, significant stakeholder management.

This submission details how all this will be achieved. Notably, it will; (1) define what this capability will look like; (2) articulate why this capability is needed - the need for change; (3) how this capability will be developed; and (4) how the challenges facing this project will be overcome.

3.2 Capability overview

The current organisational operational structure focuses on HADR, Urban search and Rescue (USAR) and Medical outputs. This proposal asserts that Regiment would scale its operational delivery to also include Security Operations. This will be achieved by staged, incremental growth, in terms of people, training and equipment procurement, over a three year period from 2025-27.

For the context of this submission, 'Security Operations' are viewed as an ability to deploy troops in a kinetic role, with firearms, both in support of, and independently from, existing security services (ie. the Police).

The Regiment will create an 'Immediate Response Group' (IRG) of highly skilled, full-time soldiers capable of (1) adding resilience to RCIPS operations, (2) operating in their own right and (3) working with UK Security Forces. This IRG will comprise of a Troop of 28x personnel who will provide force elements at very high readiness to deploy.

The Reserve element of the Regiment will also be trained in security tactics and will be able to provide significant resilience in this regard; however, noting the training liability and lead time it takes to deploy Reserve troops, this cohort will be trained to a lower standard (when compared to the IRG) and would not be able to offer an immediate operational effect. That said, this group represents the most significant uplift in trained personnel and thus offers the most resilience to domestic and national security incidents.

The IRG will have an operational capability that is validated against, and compatible with, both the Royal Cayman Islands Police Service (RCIPS) Firearms Response Unit (FRU) standards and UK Security Force tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Whilst their TTPs will be doctrinally aligned to the UK military, they will also be trained to meet police FRU standards. The interoperability and credibility in this regard is important for their operational effectiveness.

Whilst the IRG will have their own organic transport capability, this will not be armoured and, as such, will not enhance the capability at a tactical level. It will be limited to providing manoeuvre only.

To facilitate this capability development, the Regiment will grow from its current staffing level of 84x pax (13x full-time and 71x Reserve) or 38.9% of its proposed strength to 216x pax (46x full-time and 170x Reserve) by Dec 2027 – 100% of its proposed strength.

The IRG will grow at a corresponding rate, with initial operating capability (IOC) of 10x pax achieved by the end of 2025 and full operating capability (FOC) of 28x pax achieved by the end of 2027.

However, it must be noted that this project is restricted in its scope, providing only a limited foundational capability within its short timeline (2025-27). It is by no means representative of an end product. Indeed, the capability will be basic when compared to established military formations and must be further developed to provide a more credible, robust and resilient operational effect. This project is designed to provide the foundations from which to build this.

3.3 The need for change

Whilst the innovative Strategic Plan developed in Module One outlined a new organisational mission, this did not include security operations. This submission seeks to mitigate this critical shortfall in operational capability that was also identified in the same analysis, yet not resourced.

Based on the strategic plan drafted in Module One, CIRs mission is to:

Provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief to the people of the Cayman Islands and to assist the civil authorities during emergencies.

This mission reflects and formalises what the Regiment has previously been resourced for, which, in turn, reflects what were deemed to be the organisations most likely missions and tasks.

Notably, it ignores the fundamental role of a military organisation and, more specifically, the legal mandate for the Regiment within the national jurisdiction of the Cayman Islands.

For context, the Regiment's original mission statement, at its inception, was to; (1) provide security (2) provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief to the people of the Cayman Islands and the broader Caribbean region; and (3) to assist the civil authorities during emergencies.

It is important to note that this submission is not asserting that the mission statement crafted in Module One is wrong. Indeed, it is reflective of how the Regiment is resourced and its most likely missions and tasks.

However, this submission supposes that, should the available resources and political appetite be such that this project is viable, then the organisation mission statement will need to be amended. Noting this, a key factor in its successful implementation, the ability to articulate a need for change is critical. Hence, the strategic importance of this section.

3.3.1 Legal mandate

According to the Defence Law, 2020 (CIG 2020) the Regiment is responsible for:

1. The defence of the Islands;
2. Assisting the Royal Cayman Islands Police Service and the Coast Guard when called upon to do so by the Governor; and
3. Providing such humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and other duties as the Governor, after consultation with the Premier, determines.

Whilst the Regiment is established to meet some of these legal responsibilities, notably HADR operations, there is a clear and obvious delta between the full range of responsibilities and the Regiment's current operational capability; notably, the ability to defend the island and/or provide security assistance to the extant security agencies.

Therefore, one cannot ignore this objective operational mandate, as clearly defined in law.

That said, the Regiment has been justified in its development to date by rationalising the clear disconnect between its allocated budget and its broad ranging legal mandate. Consecutive budget planning cycles have highlighted the need for significantly higher budget allocations compared to what has been granted. With these reduced budgets, the Regiment has articulated to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Governor, the opportunity cost; an inability to resource a security capability that meets its broader legal mandate. In choosing not to appropriately fund the Regiment, the Minister has accepted the risk posed by the Regiment not being able to holistically meet its legal responsibilities.

Indeed, the strategic plan drafted in Module One is reflective of these budget constraints. This is also indicative of the threat analysis conducted by the Government when drafting its National Security Strategies.

However, the author asserts that this threat assessment is outdated and fundamentally flawed. The Cayman Islands is significantly ill-equipped to deal with the modern threat, necessitating a more comprehensive and resilient national security capability.

When viewed in this context, not only is the legal mandate notable, relevant and extant, but not resourcing a capability to facilitate it, should be viewed as a threat to national security and a significant legislative failure. Best case, it shows political naivety and worst case, political incompetence resulting in national security failings. If viewed in hindsight after a potential security incident resulting in loss of life and/or catastrophic damage to critical national infrastructure, the evident political incompetence of those in elected leadership positions would be apparent.

3.3.2 National Threat Picture

When viewed in isolation, the argument to develop a security capability in order to meet extant legal responsibilities might be a short-sell, especially when compared to the lived experience of ministerial budget allocation; however, this is a short-sighted view that risks national security.

Whilst it is accepted that the most likely operational missions relate to HADR taskings, one cannot ignore the threat posed by existential defence and security risks.

The military is renowned for its ability to plan. Indeed, Officers are taught to plan for the most likely situation, whilst mitigating against the most dangerous. In this sense, the most likely is HADR tasks and the most dangerous is defence and security.

However, it is clear that the Regiment, by dint of its limited funding allocation, has no mitigation in place to deal with the most dangerous situations and, thus, no resilience to offer national security threats.

The Cayman Islands is a victim of its own experience. Arguably, it is sleepwalking into a national security emergency that requires a significant uplift in capability. It risks being left woefully underprepared because of its blinkered view of the threats facing the islands; focussing on the perpetual risk of hurricanes, rather than the ever-increasing existential threat posed by the security situation.

Whilst domestic security incidents are relatively low and whilst there is no clear and present foreign threat that necessitates a robust Defence Force, there is a worrying trend illustrating that these threats are only increasing.

As with any complicated capability, they are hard to generate and take time to develop. As such, to be effective when they are actually needed, they must be developed and tested prior to a threshold being reached. Identifying the need for a security capability after a catastrophic event has occurred will be too late. In this regard, this capability should be viewed as an insurance policy. Rarely are paying insurance premiums popular; however, when they're needed, the resilience they provide is not only fundamental to maintaining the status quo, but also represents significant value for money. Notably, it is impossible to develop and leverage an insurance policy after the event.

3.3.2.1 Crime statistics

It is noted that the overall trend of recorded crimes in the Cayman Islands has reduced in the five years from 2018-2022, with the total recorded crime in 2022 approximately 7% lower than in 2018; however, towards the back end of 2022, the Royal Cayman Islands (RCIPS) noted an increase in overall levels of crime and an expectation that this would continue into 2023 with an increase in population and economic activity post-Covid (RCIPS 2023a).

Of note, 'serious violence' has steadily increased from 2018 (+5.45%), of which there were eight firearm enabled serious violent crimes, including three of the four murders and five of the six attempted murders. With an increase in the possession of unlicensed firearms, as well as ammunition, firearms crime¹ has increased significantly from 2021

¹ The crime types within the category of Firearms are Discharge Firearm in Public, Import an Unlicensed Firearm, Possession of Ammunition, and Possession to Commit Offence, Possession of Imitation, Possession of Unlicensed or Unlawful Use.

(+23%). So too has firearms enabled crime², which has increased significantly from 2021 (+114%) (RCIPS 2023b).

With this type of criminal activity on the rise, having the national capacity and resilience to deal with both an increase in frequency an increase in severity of security incidents is of strategic importance.

Along with these statistics, there is also a tangible feeling in the community that violent crime is on the rise, particularly gun related crime. The lived experience certainly mirrors the official police statistics, with the number of armed robberies, muggings and murders increasingly making the press headlines. This public feeling is also backed by data, with the firearms-related crime increasing year on year, as shown by the graph below.³




Fig 01. Firearms related crime by year (Compass 2024).

This seems to have reached a tipping point in February 2024 with a mass shooting at a local football match. Previously, the public perception, at least, was that gang related violence was predominantly insular; however, this event crossed that threshold with the indiscriminate shooting of a number of civilians caught in the crossfire. This reinforced the public narrative that the RCIPS are under resourced and lacking in capacity to respond to firearms related major incidents. With these increasing in frequency, a resilient national security capability is clearly needed.

² A crime in which a firearm was seen or used in the commission of the offence.

³ Figures pre-2016 relate to the number of arrests made for firearm-related crime. Prior to 2016, the RCIPS official statistics only listed the number of arrests made in relation to the possession of an imitation or unlicensed firearm, or the discharge of a firearm (Compass 2024).

3.3.2.2 Demographics

These crime statistics are further exacerbated by trends in national demographics. According to census data, the population of Cayman has increased by c.330% between 1990 and 2023. An increase from 25,355 in 1990 (CIG 2023d) to 83,871 in 2023 (CIG 2023a). It is also asserted that in the period 2022-23, there was a 6.5% increase alone (CIG 2023a). With population increasing at a seemingly exponential rate, with no sign of waning, it is imperative that the islands' ability to deal with a corresponding increase in domestic security issues increases to meet these new challenges.




Fig 02. Population of Cayman Islands 1802-2021 (CIG 2021).




Fig 03. Population of Cayman Islands 1802-2021 (CIG 2023d)

In broadly the same period of 1990-2023, the RCIPS has increased its staffing levels from 221 in 1990 (RCIPS 2024) to 404 in 2023 (OCP 2023) – a total increase of c.183%. There is therefore a significant disparity between the increased size of the community that the RCIPS are liable to police and the amount of staff they have to do this.

Furthermore, whilst there are limited legacy budget statistics for the RCIPS available in the public domain, one can evidence that their budget has also failed to increase relative to the population. In 2007⁴ their annual budget was \$23.5M (KYD) (CIG 2008) and in 2023 their annual budget was \$53.7M (KYD) (CIG 2023e). Whilst at face value this represents a significant 129% increase, when one factors in an inflation⁵ rate of 41.13%, the \$23.5M budget in 2007 is comparable to a \$33.2M budget in 2022 (MES 2024). This represents a net budget increase of \$20.5M or 62%; however, during roughly the same period, the population had increased from c.49,647 (MacroTrends 2024) to 83,871 (CIG 2023a) or c.69%. This is exacerbated by the increased cost of policing required to tackle the upsurge in complex and technologically advanced crime.

Whilst the comparison here might seem over-simplified, as it doesn't not factor in a number of elements (such as advancements in technology and economies of scale), the disparity is significant enough to assert that they have failed to grow in size relative to the community they must provide security for.

With a population increasing at a seemingly exponential rate, that far exceeds the amount of available resources, it is clear that the RCIPS are under resourced to deal with the increased frequency and complexity of security incidents, in terms of both staffing levels and budget.

It is also recognised that the demand on mental health services in the Cayman Islands has increased significantly over the last 10 years (HSA 2023). Whilst this may be partially attributed to an increase in awareness, the associated increase in mentally unstable criminal 'crank'⁶ activities should not also be overlooked.

3.3.2.3 The Economy

With over 250,000 overnight visitors and 635,000 cruise ship visitors in the first six months of 2024 alone (DoT 2024), tourism is commonly referred to as one of the two pillars of the Cayman economy, finance being the other (CIG 2023b). As such, tourism accounts for a considerable part of the GDP and about three-quarters of foreign currency earnings (Lloyds 2024). In the post-pandemic era where traveler confidence is returning, tourist visits to the Cayman Islands is increasing greatly. Not only does this pose a threat in terms of the movement of people (and therefore potential threat actors), but with a significant proportion of tourists arriving from 'western' countries (c.96% from the USA, UK and Ireland, Continental Europe and Canada (CIG 2022)), the threat from terrorist groups is elevated.

⁴ Earliest available figure on public record.

⁵ Based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI), where \$1 in 2007 would be worth \$1.41 in 2022 or \$1 in 2022 would be worth \$0.71 in 2007.

⁶ Legal definition: a term vulgarly applied to a person of eccentric, ill-regulated, and unpractical mental habits; a person half-crazed, a monomaniac; not necessarily equivalent to "insane person," "lunatic," or any other term descriptive of complete mental derangement, and not carrying any implication of homicidal mania.

Whilst there have been no historic incidents of terror-related activity, nor is it perceived that an attack is likely, the threat posed from terror groups cannot be ignored. As a British Overseas Territory (BOT), with a buoyant economy, and a thriving tourist industry (based predominantly on 'Western' visitors), Cayman could be perceived as a 'soft' target.

Notwithstanding this threat to life, the threat to reputation is also significant. If Cayman is perceived to be incapable of managing its own internal security issues, the effect this would have on the tourism industry and, in turn, the economy, could be catastrophic. Noting the number of expatriates who also staff the extremely buoyant finance sector, it would also likely cause economic effects there too.

Therefore, whilst the cost of developing and maintaining a resilient national security capability might seem expensive at face value, its value for money is clear.

3.3.2.4 Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)

CNI is infrastructure considered essential by governments for the functioning of a society and economy, thus deserving of special protection for national security. With two international airports, a seaport (freight and cruise), a number of hospitals, a busy domestic transport network and a diverse utilities infrastructure (water, electric, fuel, gas, internet (etc)), in addition to a substantial tourism sector, there is a plethora of CNI that requires special consideration from a national security perspective. Being able to provide a resilient security capability is an important component of ensuring a robust national security framework.

It is clear that the current security force lacks both the capacity and resilience to protect key sites if needed. An inability to do this in a national security situation presents a significant threat to national resilience.

3.3.3 A VUCA World

Whilst the nature of conflict hasn't changed, the character certainly has. The age of state-on-state aggression has been replaced by a more complicated, irregular conflict, characterised by sub-threshold activity and non-state actors. It is common to see sub-state forces or intra-state actors; non-uniformed, at least on one side, engaging in terrorism or insurgency and unconventional tactics.⁷

The term 'VUCA' (volatile, uncertain complex and ambiguous) was originally used by Benning and Nanus in 1985 referring to challenges faced by business leaders and managers (Benning & Nanus 1985). However, such is its ubiquitous relationship with the current character of conflict, it is, more often than not, cited as being a phrase invented by the US War College in 1987 to describe the impact of the collapse of the USSR. It remains prevalent to this day.

⁷ Whilst there are clearly some contradictions to this (notably the conflict in Ukraine) the general principle remains relevant.

Indeed, in July 2024 the current head of the British Army, General Sir Roland Walker, stated that the “UK must be ready to fight a war in three years” (BBC 2024), citing an “increasingly volatile” world and an “axis of upheaval”. Such is its importance, the British Army Staff College has developed its strategic course content to teach Officers at all levels the leadership and planning skills required for VUCA military situations such as ‘inference, improvisation, divergent thinking, creativity and intuition’, asserting that these ‘are all thinking skills derived from the subconscious ability to find meaningful patterns in complex, ambiguous and emotionally-charged situations’ (UK MoD 2016).

Furthermore, The UK MoD’s Future Trends programme highlights the threats posed by the future operating environment; ‘There are likely to be significant challenges resulting from population growth, migration, greater demand for energy, climate change, continuing globalisation, rapid urbanisation and the exponential rate of change in some readily-available technologies. A combination of these factors may lead to challenges at home, as well as fragility and instability within the wider international system’ (MoD 2014).

It is in this context of increased fragility, against a back-drop of future challenges, that the Cayman Islands needs a Regiment that can provide a military instrument in support of the national security resilience.

On July 20th 2024, President Biden claimed that for the first time in two decades the US was at peace (Biden 2024). Despite that, in the following days a US pilot was the first American female to record an air-to-air kill and the US (with its Allies) continued to shoot down Houthi drones on an almost daily basis (USCENTCOM 2024 & Aljazeera 2024 & Guardian 2024). Also noteworthy is US support to Ukraine in the form of military aid to fight Russia and its continued support to Israel’s fight against Hamas.

Furthermore, on the 26th July, France witnessed a resurgence of ‘old school’ sabotage methods, paralyzing the national rail network, mere hours before the Olympics’ opening ceremony was due to start.

Examples are worryingly numerous, and these are just some recent ones. The world may not be ‘at war’, but the international community is certainly in a fight, a fight characterised by the uncertainty and the unconventional nature of conflict.

Thus, the world finds itself in an ever-increasing state of neither peace nor war, sitting in a murky ‘Grey Zone’ of harm that deliberately sits under the threshold of what would normally be described as war. The term ‘hybrid war’ is used interchangeably with that of warfare in the grey zone and the colour grey alludes to a sense of ambiguity and an inability to draw distinctions (Hughes 2021).

General Sir Nick Carter, notes that ‘we are in a state of contest [...] every day we see our adversaries using cyber tools against us, using disinformation [...], using financial

corruption, using organised crime, to divide us, to weaken us or to compete with us' (Carter 2021).

It is increasingly common for aggressors to no longer risk direct military action which would likely face a response in kind. Instead, they seek to exploit subterfuge and confusion to achieve their objectives, creating a 'fait accompli', which leaves little alternative but to either do nothing or escalate to direct military action. The Grey Zone aggressor can therefore achieve its objectives with minimum bloodshed.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Graeme Lamb, former Director UK Special Forces, notes that the terms peace and war are no longer relevant; 'we are being attacked in a non-traditional way and if we do not act then we risk having our democracy slowly unravelled in front of us, without a shot being fired' (Lamb 2021).

Whilst much of the research and literature about the Grey Zone challenge focusses on identifying and characterising the problem, it is clear that a proportionate response, one below the threshold of overt armed conflict, is required to combat such activities (Morris 2019). Indeed, such is the plethora of threats in the Grey Zone, some of which we probably are not even aware of yet, a clear response is necessitated (Connel 2021).

Whilst this clearly asserts a need for a raft of capabilities to combat these sub-threshold activities, one cannot ignore the increasingly volatile world and increased security threat it poses. Whilst technologically advanced counter measures are integral to a holistic and integrated response, the need to improve physical security to meet this increased and uncertain threat cannot be overlooked.

Some may argue that the analysis here is limited. Referencing predominantly UK and US sources incorrectly transfers the elevated international threat level posed to leading western states onto Cayman. However, the author is not asserting that the threat level posed to Cayman is the same as the UK and the US; rather, that the international threat level is such that all other countries should take notice and take mitigating actions.

Cayman does not need to generate a military capability anywhere near to achieving parity with the UK or US, or even spend an equivalent amount of GDP on Defence; however, the increasingly volatile world does require the national leadership to recognise that a more resilient national security capability is required.

3.3.4 Risk to Reputation

Noting the certainty of such threats manifesting, it is important to acknowledge the risk of being unprepared. Notwithstanding the obvious risk to life and the economy, as has already been identified herein, one must also consider a significant risk to reputation.

Should a security or Defence issue occur, and the national infrastructure be overwhelmed and incapable of providing an appropriate response, it would be seen as

failure of national government. Resourcing a police force that lacks any resilience and a 'military' that is not resourced to defend the island would be seen, in hindsight, as a significant strategic failing. This would no doubt create an existential threat to the administration of the day.

In addition, it also poses a significant risk to the Regiment's reputation. Whilst the Regiment has been consistent in its messaging to both the public, other agencies and the national executive, as to its realistic operational capability (noting it is not resourced to provide a security capability), should such an incident happen and the Regiment be impotent in its response, it could irreparably harm public confidence in the organisation. Using hindsight once more, it would be hard to defend the political decision not to resource the islands' sole military formation to provide a security capability and meet its legal responsibilities therein.

3.3.5 Why the Regiment

Some may argue that whilst the argument for additional funding for security is evident, the need for this to be provided by the Regiment is less so. However, the Regiment offers four distinct and collectively unique advantages; (1) value for money; (2) formal links to UK MoD; (3) an existing critical mass of people and kit; and (4) a resilient military culture.

As a Reserve organisation, the Regiment can train a pool of competent personnel and hold them at readiness whilst not employing them full-time. Being able to activate these competent persons only when required is clearly cheaper than employing them on a permanent basis; making significant savings on personnel costs. Despite the training liability needed to keep these Reserve personnel current and competent, it still represents a value for money solution to a capability issue which is driven by a periodic lack of capacity and resilience. Hence, being able to employ these personnel as and when the need arises is a cost-effective methodology to solving the capacity issue.

With established links with the UK Military and standing relationships within the MoD, the Regiment is uniquely placed to coordinate any external military support to the islands. Should the situation dictate, a UK military presence then these relationships would be pivotal to the rapid and successful coordination, deployment and integration of force elements. Furthermore, it is logical that the Regiment would partner with these units, providing a joint and integrated response to a major incident, with Caymanian personnel remaining central to any overseas contribution. As such, an ability to deliver a credible security capability, aligned to the UK standard (albeit at a much reduced level of combined arms lethality) is imperative.

Despite only being a few years old, the Regiment has a critical mass of people and equipment. Whilst an enhanced security and defence role would necessitate a strategic uplift in this regard, it is well placed to taken on this responsibility and, notably, the inertia of creating a new organisation would not need to be overcome, at great expense.

Furthermore, with its close link to the UK military's values and standards, the Regiment has an established military culture and an ethos of providing a robust, resilient and enduring operational output. Soldiers are inherently different from police officers or civil servants etc. Their nature is to endure hardship; to work long hours, to be sleep deprived, to operate in austere conditions, to put their needs behind those of their peers and their country etc. It is these attributes that will be required when called upon in a major security and/or defence incident.

3.3.6 Conclusion

With a tangible increase in threat level, exacerbated by an exponentially increasing population and decreasing police resources (both funding and personnel), there is a significant lack of national resilience to deal with both domestic security issues and any sort of national or international defence incidents.

It is also clear that, based on the capacity of the current national security capability, the impact of such an event would be catastrophic. Whilst the RCIPS does have a security capability in the Firearms Response Unit (FRU), this is exceptionally limited, becoming fixed during domestic firearms related incidents. Capacity and resilience are therefore required to meet this increasing threat picture.

Furthermore, as a BOT, there is a risk that the Cayman Islands underestimates the additional risk posed by this relationship and political proximity to the UK. In addition, there is a risk that the Cayman Islands relies on the UK for security and Defence. The need to invest heavily in developing its own capability is therefore a waste of public money. This arrogant and naive assumption could prove catastrophic. Whilst the Governor is ultimately responsible for Defence and Security and therefore, by extension, the UK government, the over confidence and over reliance on the UK in this regard could prove fatal. The UK only has a persistent military presence in the region for six months of the year, during hurricane season, and this has extremely limited security capability – resourced only for HADR activity. Noting this, and the lead time for any police or military units arriving from the UK, Cayman must be able to organically generate a robust and resilient security response in the immediate term at least, prior to follow-on forces arriving from the UK.

Noting that developing a resilient national security infrastructure takes time and that the occurrence of such security and/or defence issues are a matter of 'when' and not 'if', it is imperative that the Cayman Islands starts developing a security capability in earnest, if it is to mitigate the threats posed by these future challenges. The Cayman Islands must take out this 'insurance policy' now, before it is too late.

This submission therefore considers the analysis in the previous two modules and aims to outline a capability development project focussing purely on traditional military security activity, whilst at the same time offering some deeper analysis and functional guidance in terms of implementation.

3.4 How the capability will be developed & how will challenges be overcome

3.4.1 Recruitment

First and foremost, developing a security capability requires people. Therefore, to facilitate the additional capability, whilst maintaining its current operational outputs, the Regiment will grow from its current staffing level of 84x pax (13x full-time and 71x Reserve) or 38.9% of its proposed strength to 216x pax (46x full-time and 170x Reserve) by Dec 2027 – 100% of its proposed strength. Growth is staged over this three-year period as follows:

Year	Establishment				
	FT Offr ⁸	FT OR ⁹	Res Offr ¹⁰	Res OR ¹¹	Total
Current	8	5	4	67	84
Dec 2025	8	22	7	88	125
Dec 2026	8	33	11	113	165
Dec 2027	11	35	12	158	216

Tab 01. Current and future establishment.

A 257% increase in personnel over three years represents a significant recruiting challenge. The Regiment will adopt an aggressive recruitment strategy which must start in earnest in 2025. Recruitment will be staged over the three years as follows:

Year	Recruiting Target		
	OCdt ¹²	Tpr ¹³	Total
2025	3	38	41
2026	4	36	40
2027	4	47	51

Tab 02. Recruiting Targets.

Recognising the administrative burden of recruiting, in addition to the training liability of each new recruit, it makes financial and practical sense to deliver the yearly recruitment targets in singular, focussed recruitment drives, culminating in a consolidated recruit training package towards the end of each year.

⁸ Full-Time Officer (Offr).

⁹ Full-Time Other Rank (OR). An OR is classed as someone between the rank of Trooper (Tpr) and Warrant Officer (WO).

¹⁰ Reserve Officer. A Reserve is a trained member of the Regiment employed on a part-time basis. They may be activated in a Major Incident. They are only paid for the time they are on duty.

¹¹ Reserve Other Rank (OR).

¹² Officer Cadet (OCdt). Entry level Officer – pending completion of recruit training and a Commissioning Course.

¹³ Trooper (Tpr). Entry level OR – pending completion of recruit training.

Recruitment will follow an extant process, that the Regiment has previously used, which leverages a tried and tested legislative model required to navigate the necessary bureaucracy of civil service recruitment. The internal administrative process will require minor tweaks, but will remain largely extant. That said, subsequent training will require a significant overhaul. This is discussed in section 3.4.3.

The challenge in achieving this 257% increase in personnel should not be underestimated. The nuanced demographics of the island significantly hamper the ability to achieve this goal. With a population of only c.83,871 (CIG 2023a) the recruitment pool is already limited. This is exacerbated further by additional recruitment limitations, such as; age (18-55), nationality (must be Caymanian or hold Permanent Resident Status), criminal record checks, and fitness.

Whilst the 18-55 age bracket represents c.76% the population, the real restriction lies in nationality; according to the most recent census date, 47% of the population are expatriates and therefore excluded from joining. Noting the fact that the Regiment is also in direct competition for people with the other uniformed services on island, this further inhibits their ability to recruit.

In order to mitigate this and enhance the Regiment's ability to meet this challenging recruitment target, it will seek an amendment to the Defence Law (CIG 2020), clause 14(1), which limits recruitment to Caymanians or Permanent Residency holders, allowing for expatriates with resident status (ie. a work permit) to join the Reserve Staff. Full-time staff will remain Caymanian. Whilst the transient nature of expatriates is recognised, with a highly motivated pool of expatriates on island, this seems to be the most pragmatic solution to the issue. Recruitment will still prioritise Caymanian applicants over non-Caymanian, only allowing non-Caymanian to join when the organisation can evidence a lack of suitable Caymanians.

3.4.2 Organisational Structure

This significant increase in personnel necessitates a modified organisational structure. The structural change will be iterative, morphing into its final state by the end of 2027.

Detailed organisational charts illustrating what the Regiment will look like at a sub-unit level by 2027 can be seen in the chart below:




Fig 03. CIR Organisational Overview (2027)

The Security component will be primarily facilitated by the 28x person Immediate Response Group (IRG). This will be a highly skilled, full-time body of personnel held at a very high readiness level, able to immediately respond to a security incident.

Noting that the IRG will only be deployed in a security role for very limited periods of time, the organisational structure has been amended to create routine employment, so that they can be employed on a full-time basis. This cohort represents the majority of full-time staff and, as such, they will be employed in supporting roles on a daily basis; for example, logistic managers, instructors, administrators, mechanics etc. When called upon they will leverage their security skill-set to provide this resilience to domestic and national security incidents.

A cohort of 35x full-time troops are required to facilitate this 28x strong IRG. This will enable a lean roulement of leave, sickness, courses etc, whilst maintaining a operational and deployable 28x person security capability.

The Reserve element of the Regiment will also be trained in security tactics and will be able to provide significant resilience in this regard; however, noting the training liability and lead time it takes to deploy Reserve troops, this cohort will be trained to a lower standard and would not be able to offer an immediate operational effect. That said, this group represents a significant uplift in trained personnel and thus offers the most resilience to domestic and national security incidents.

Outside of the security component, the Regiment will exploit this opportunity to re-organise into a more operationally focussed, flexible and resilient structure. Notably, the new structure will (1) create specific training teams, (2) uplift technically qualified staff,

(3) increase geographical force laydown, (4) enable representation at all levels of the national command structure, and (5) create a Special Advisory Group (SAG).

Currently, instructional staff are employed in other functional areas. Instructing is an additional duty and, therefore, the training delivered is not as professional as it would be if dedicated training staff were employed. The new structure will change this, with ring-fenced training roles. This will be important with the significantly increased training liability associated with enabling security operations, in terms of both numbers through the training pipeline and additional technical training objectives.

The Regiment already suffers from having a sizeable vehicle and equipment fleet and a corresponding understrength Logistic Department tasked with preventative service and repair. This problem will only grow with the need for more vehicles and equipment. It is important, therefore, that the Regiment recruits personnel to meet these technical requirements.

More staff will also enable the Regiment to increase its geographical operational footprint. Notably, it will be able to deploy troops to more remote population centres. The current HADR operational model sees the Regiment deploying to two locations; however, this structure will facilitate five centres of mass; A Sqn in West Bay, George Town and Prospect, and B Sqn in Bodden Town, Savannah, East End and the Sister Islands.

Full time staff will also be task organised to facilitate an internal command structure and functional grouping in an full-scale operational deployment, ensuring the Regiment is represented at all levels of the National Command Structure. The Strategic Command Group (SCG) will represent strategic interests at GOLD Command and the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) Group will represent tactical interests at SILVER Command. The IRG will form the immediate operational force responding to a major incident and the Support and Services (Sp & Svc) Group will sustain any deployment.




Fig 04. CIR task organisation and functional grouping in a full-scale deployment.

The SAG will be a supernumerary group of civilian personnel qualified in niche technical or specialist areas; such as a Doctor, Lawyer, Structural Engineer, Specialist Search Advisor etc. These personnel will only be called upon when a specific situation arises where the Regiment would benefit from their technical expertise. This is a value for money way of leveraging highly skilled competencies that would otherwise be both difficult to recruit and expensive to retain.

3.4.3 Training

With the development of a new operational capability, there will be a significant training liability, in terms of both numbers through the training pipeline and additional technical training objectives. This will manifest itself in three key areas; (1) recruit training; (2) security tactics; and (3) leadership development.

An annual recruit training package will be delivered. This will correspond with the annual recruitment drives, ensuring all new personnel are appropriately inducted into the organisation. The extant recruit training plan will need to be amended to include a basic understanding of security tactics, whilst maintaining the core HADR and USAR competencies. In order to facilitate these additional training objectives recruits will complete a 16x day residential course, in addition to two subsequent continuation training weekends.

The development of the IRG necessitates some specific specialist training to generate a credible security capability. For the IRG to achieve IOC it will train 10x pax in security

tactics by the end of 2025 and to achieve FOC it will train a further 18x pax by the end of 2027. With no existing operational capability, instructor competence or appropriate training estate, this is easier said than done.

To overcome this, the Regiment will leverage the 10x personnel it currently has trained in Skill at Arms and Range Management. Whilst these competency levels fall significantly short of what is required, they provide a credible cohort from which to develop. With an existing knowledge of weapon handling and weapon safety, in addition to a basic understanding of the marksmanship principles and live firing, their ability to assimilate the additional tactical information and apply it in practical scenarios will be expedited.

Credible instructors will take time to organically generate and, noting the lack of appropriate training estate, the Regiment will leverage instructional courses and exercises with regional partners. With close links to Jamaican, which has a well-established infantry focussed, Defence Force, this presents a good solution. Indeed, the author has recently completed a reconnaissance (recce) trip to Jamaica to further build relationships with the JDF and agree (in principle) the ability to leverage their extant infantry-focussed training packages.

The author has also recce'd Camp Lejeune (a world-class military training base in the US) which could be used in consort with the Royal Bermuda Regiment (RBR) (another British Overseas Territory) who have a Service Level Agreement (SLA) in place with the US Military to use this training estate at cost price. The author has an agreement in place with RBR to leverage this SLA and conduct joint security training in Camp Lejeune with RBR.

Furthermore, the author has developed close working relationships with the RCIPS at both the strategic and operational levels. The Regiment already conduct joint training with the Firearms Response Unit (FRU) and would continue to do so when formalising this security capability. Ensuring compatibility between the Regiment and FRU will be important for future operational effectiveness.

The increase in personnel, combined with the added complexity of leading troops in kinetic security operations will also necessitate additional leadership development training. Whilst generic leadership development is delivered via internally run cadres for junior non-commissioned officers (JNCOs) and externally run officer courses, the Regiment will need to facilitate security specific courses for commanders at all levels, both within the IRG and the broader Reserve cohort.

Noting the limitations discussed above, the Regiment will leverage the same regional partners who already provide this training. In addition, links with the UK MoD will also be exploited. The Regiment already sends officers to train at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) for Phase One Training, but this will also now extend to sending

selected Officers to The Infantry Battle School to attend the Platoon Commanders' Battle Course (PCBC) for Phase Two Training.

Noting the small numbers that will require leadership development training at any one time, it makes practical sense to maintain this method of leveraging external courses. Notwithstanding the UK courses, which come with course fees attached, the courses delivered by regional partners represent viable training solutions and offer good value for money. They are already run below capacity; therefore, sending CIR staff on these represents 'wooden dollars' and hence no fees would be charged. Not only is this a value for money solution but, more importantly, it will develop life-long professional networks between CIR staff and the regional military community. These professional connections will no doubt lead to relationships that can be leveraged for the benefit of the Regiment. This will have a force multiplying effect on organisational growth and enhance credibility in the region.

The Regiment will also need to develop technical specialists to sustain the organisation; for example, mechanics, electricians, medics etc. With no organic ability to train these personnel, the Regiment will once again look to outsource. The author is currently in discussions with the University College Cayman Islands (UCCI), who provides a raft of trade courses, to offer work-placements to young Caymanian's already completing these courses. The Regiment would actively recruit these qualified tradespeople on completion of their training, thereby negating the initial technical training liability. Subsequent trade training will be delivered by UCCI and by leveraging the regional partners already discussed.

The author has also created a clinical portfolio workbook and agreed a clinical pathway with a local hospital (Doctors' Hospital) to facilitate the continuous professional development of the Regiment's trained medical staff. Establishing and enhancing this new relationship will be key to the development of a robust and credible medical capability.

3.4.4 Financial implications

It is important to understand the costs associated with this force development activity, which will require substantial supplementary funding. This will necessitate the endorsement, submission and approval of a Cabinet Paper.

An overview of the costs can be seen in the table below:

Year	Headline Costs			Totals / Year ¹⁴
	Personnel	Train	Sustain	
2025	\$590,985	\$445,080	\$797,455	\$1,833,520
2026	\$2,097,700	\$734,999	\$803,125	\$3,635,824
2027	\$2,371,830	\$943,932	\$500,342	\$3,816,104
Totals / Group	\$5,060,515	\$2,124,011	\$2,100,922	\$9,285,448

Tab 03. Headline costs.

Personnel costs represent the majority of the supplementary funding requirement, as an increase in establishment will result in a corresponding increase in personnel costs. Costs are as follows:

Year	Cost			Additional cost from current 24 budget ¹⁵
	Total Reg Pers Cost	Total Res Pers Cost ¹⁶	Total	
Current	\$1,209,000.00	\$199,000.00	\$1,408,000.00	-
2025	\$1,743,000.00	\$199,000.00	\$1,942,000.00	\$534,000.00
2026	\$3,261,000.00	\$215,000.00	\$3,476,000.00	\$2,068,000.00
2027	\$3,402,000.00	\$348,000.00	\$3,750,000.00	\$2,342,000.00

Tab 04. Personnel costs.

Additional costs will be incurred when recruiting, assessing and vetting new staff, from both on island and overseas. Costs are as follows:

¹⁴ Totals represent the figures required to achieve the capability development project only and exclude existing budget requirements to facilitate current activity.

¹⁵ Costs represent additional costs to what have already been budgeted for in FY24&25 and assumes a budget for 26 would mirror FY24/25.

¹⁶ Reserve personnel costs are based on the new staffing figures but only against the current training plan. This training plan will increase to accommodate the new operational liability – these costs are captured under ‘Training’ below.

Year	Cost			Total
	FT Staff (Overseas)	FT Staff (from Res Cohort)	Res Staff (Local)	
2025	\$28,500 ¹⁷	\$8,050 ¹⁸	\$20,435 ¹⁹	\$56,985
2026	\$0	\$6,325 ²⁰	\$23,375 ²¹	\$29, 700
2027	\$0	\$575 ²²	\$29,255 ²³	\$29,830

Tab 05. Recruiting costs.

In order to upskill personnel to meet the operational requirements set out in this capability plan, the following additional training will be conducted:²⁴

Year	Training						Total
	Annual Camp ²⁵	CCS ²⁶	Trade Training ²⁷	Security ²⁸	Recruit Training ²⁹	Training Days ³⁰	
2025	\$149,500	\$89,397	\$5,000	\$12,000	\$90,139	\$99,044	\$445,080
2026	\$401, 848	\$89,397	\$5,000	\$26,832	\$101,139	\$110,783	\$734,999
2027	\$535,618	\$102,411	\$0	\$26,832	\$127,139	\$151,932	\$943,932

Tab 06. Training costs.

In order to sustain this project the following procurement and logistical support is required:

¹⁷ Costs based on recruiting 3x staff members from overseas (+1 family member); 1x TWO & 2x Trg Sgt. Includes freight, flights, accommodation, hire car etc.

¹⁸ Costs based on 17x staff and includes website re-design.

¹⁹ Costs based on 21x recruits and includes medicals, advertising, travel and subsistence needed to recruit in Brac, Infra etc.

²⁰ Costs based on 11x staff.

²¹ Costs based on 25x recruits.

²² Costs based on 1x staff.

²³ Costs based on 45x recruits.

²⁴ These figures represent additional costs to what have already been budgeted for in FY24&25 and assumes a budget for FY26 would mirror FY24/25.

²⁵ 16x days residential. Local based in 24, but based in Camp Lejeune for 25&26.

²⁶ Commissioning Course Short – RMAS.

²⁷ Based on attendance at UCCI trade training course – mechanic, electrician etc. Assumes 75% new hires in specialist roles already qualified.

²⁸ IRG specific training only.

²⁹ 2x week residential package with 2x weekends of continuation training.

³⁰ 11x additional training days each year.

Year	Procurement									Total
	Kit Issue ³¹	Rifles ³²	Feeding ³³	Vehicles ³⁴	Equip ³⁵	Ammo ³⁶	PPE ³⁷	Onboard ³⁸	Office Space ³⁹	
2024	\$119,966	\$110,000	\$4,500	\$260,000	\$88,000	\$44,000	\$157,489	\$13,500	\$0	\$797,455
2025	\$117,040	\$74,000	\$8,910	\$250,000	\$88,000	\$54,000	\$176,675	\$7,500	\$27,000	\$803,125
2026	\$108,262	\$0	\$14,080	\$210,000	\$60,000	\$54,000	\$0	\$0	\$54,000	\$500,342

Tab 07. Procurement costs.

3.4.5 Stakeholder management

With any significant public expense there is a clear need to justify the capital and operational expenditure required. Getting the necessary Cabinet Paper endorsed, submitted and approved will require careful stakeholder management.

Receiving this funding is essential to being able to deliver this project; therefore, an ability to influence the appropriate stakeholders is critical. Indeed, this represents the single point of failure for the entire project.

Noting the significance of this part of the project, the Regiment's ability to articulate the reason why an enhanced national security capability is needed cannot be understated. Indeed, this was the rationale behind including such a detailed narrative in section 3.3.

With the 'why' clarified, it is important to understand the 'how'.

To achieve this 'influence campaign' the Regiment will first aim to gain the approval of the Governor. Whilst she does not have a budget which she can allocate, she holds significant political influence and her ability to lobby key senior political figures will be crucial. Furthermore, as the King's representative within this BOT, she is ultimately responsible for the security and defence of the islands. As such, she must be the first person to have sight of this project.

Approval from the Minister responsible for the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the elected representative responsible the portfolio in which the Regiment sits, comes next.

³¹ \$2926pp.

³² \$2000 per Rifle. 2024: +55. 2025: +37. 2026: +0.

³³ 10pp/meal for additional training days. 2024: +41. 2025: +81. 2026: +132,

³⁴ 2024: 2x TCV & 1x Coaster (coach). 2025: 1x Coaster, 2x Hilux, 1x Ranger & 1x Box Truck. 2026: 1x TCV & 2x Hilux.

³⁵ 2024: 2x TM60, 2x AC Unit, 2x Generator & 1x ISO. 2025: 2x TM60, 2x AC Unit, 2x Generator & 1x ISO 2026: 2x AC Unit & 2x Generator.

³⁶ 2024: 50k 5.56mm & 50k 9mm. 2025: 60k 5.56mm & 60k 9mm. 2026: 60k 5.56mm & 60k 9mm

³⁷ Uplift in personal issued kit, Ballistic PPE & Sig P9 Pistols.

³⁸ \$1500pp – Laptop & phone for FT staff LCpl and above.

³⁹ \$4,500 pcm for 1x additional unit at Windjammer Plaza. 2026: 6x months. 2027: 12x months.

With the Governor and MHA's approval, the initial inertia of gaining strategic approval will have been overcome. Gaining approval from other Cabinet Members will be significantly easier from this point. However, that is not to say it will be straight forward.

A more indirect approach will also be adopted to curry support from additional elected representatives. Key constituencies on Grand Cayman and the Sister Islands will be targeted. The Regiment will run public 'road shows' to develop a public narrative for an enhanced security capability that will be able to influence their respective elected representatives.

Furthermore, these roadshows will be crucial in dispelling fears and a cultural nervousness associated with the military. In a number of Caribbean countries (for example, Jamaica and Turks and Caicos) the military has grown in power, playing a significant role in domestic security. This is perceived by many to be at the detriment of their civil liberties. This is further exacerbated by the Regiment's close links with the UK and the negative connotations that has with a perceived controlling influence by an 'foreign' state.

3.4.6 Project management and timeline

This is a significant project with multiple moving parts and must be carefully project managed. To facilitate this, a Gantt Chart has been produced which covers the key activities that need to be delivered over the period 2025-27; (1) decision points that need to be confirmed outside the organisation, (2) recruitment of full-time staff, (3) recruitment of Reserve staff, (4) training activity, (5) procurement of vehicles and equipment, and (6) key capability development milestones.

A copy of this Gantt Chart is shown below for illustrative purposes; however, the same version, with more clarity, can be seen at Annex A.




Fig 05. Gantt Chart.

3.5 Conclusion

This submission has; (1) clearly defined the capability parameters; (2) created a detailed narrative supporting the need for change; (3) analysed key aspects relevant to successful project delivery; and (4) highlighted challenges and identified solutions associated with these.

Whilst the need for an enhanced and resilient national security capability is clear, the ability to deliver it represents a significant strategic challenge. Notably, the ability to influence key stakeholders and overcome that initial inertia in order to secure approval and, in turn, the required supplementary funding, which represents the single point of failure to the whole project.

This project illustrates the most advanced frontiers within this specific field work. Generating a traditional military capability, from scratch, for a self-governing Nation State, with no previous national experience or infrastructure in this regard, is unique. It is exceptionally rare, in this modern era of Defence, for Nation States to (1) not have a military or Defence Force and (2) develop one from scratch. Most militaries are able to leverage decades, or even centuries, of collective corporate and collective experience, a national military culture and tradition, and an established Defence infrastructure.

The opportunity to develop a new military and shape this capability based on the current security and defence landscape is therefore unique, challenging and exciting in equal measure. It requires an expert understanding of; (1) capability development; (2) project management; (3) Defence; (4) the nuanced regional operating and security context; and (5) national and international politics. Being able to combine all of these aspects and create a credible capability development plan is therefore illustrative of both the most advanced frontiers within this specific field of work and new ideas and processes at the forefront of the author's work.

As the project is born from critical evaluation conducted in the preceding modules, the project evidently illustrates the advanced and specialised skills and techniques required to solve critical business problems and, in so doing, redefines professional practice within the organisation. Notably, re-focusing operational activity on traditional defence roles, as opposed to humanitarian ones, represents a fundamental shift in strategic output, requiring significant organisational changes. This project provides a worked solution to an issue identified through critical analysis, whilst also articulating a professional, comprehensive and realistic implementation plan.

The author's ability to evaluate a strategic issue and offer credible, considered solutions with a practical implementation plan further evidences their substantial authority and autonomy in their specific field within the Defence Sector. The author is able to evidence significant strategic insight and decision-making authority. For example, they have (1) defined a strategic organisational problem that has both national and

international political considerations; (2) developed a strategic budget analysis, whilst also offering a high degree of granularity; (3) created a credible implementation plan across multiple business functional areas, offering a pragmatic solution to a complex problem; and (4) developed a detailed pathway for professional development.

Furthermore, with few, if any, recent, credible or relevant examples of a similar project being conducted, this project is, by its very nature, innovative.

The author has also been conscious and mindful of professional integrity throughout this project, focusing on specific capability outcomes, procurement methods and funding streams that do not compromise their strong adherence to moral and ethical principles.

Annex A: Gantt Chart

		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	
2025	Decision Point			Authority to Recruit Reg & Res Authority to start procurement							Load CCS TY 26 Confirm Budget FY26			
	Reg Recruitment				Recruit Reg Staff (ORs - 3x Overseas & 14x local)				Reg Staff Onbarded (local)	Reg Staff Onbarded (overseas)				
	Res Recruitment				Recruit Res Staff (21x pax, local)		Sift Applications	Assess / Select Res Staff						
	Training				JNCO Cadre (3x W/E)			Camp (16x days, residential, local)		CCS (2x OCdt)		Recruit Training (21x Tpr, 16x days Residential)	Continuation W/E	Continuation W/E
										IRG Security Training (10x pax)				
	Procurement				Procure Vehicles: 2x TCV & 1x Coaster (coach)					Vehicles Arrive				
	Dev Milestones				Procure Eqpt: 2x TM60, 2x AC Unit, 2x Generator, 1x ISO, Rifles, Ammo, PPE & Pers Kit					Equipment Arrive				
								All Tpr WHT & APWT					IRG @ IOC	
2026	Decision Point		Authority to Recruit Reg & Res								Load CCS TY 27 Confirm Budget FY27			
	Reg Recruitment				Recruit Reg Staff (11x local)				Reg Staff Onbarded (local)					
	Res Recruitment				Recruit Res Staff (25x local)		Sift Applications	Assess / Select Res Staff						
	Training	CCS (2x OCdt) (or Jun/Jul)		Offr Continuation Trg (Ph2) - Security TTPs	JNCO Cadre (3x W/E)		Camp (16x days, residential, overseas - CLJ)			Recruit Training (25x Tpr, 16x days Residential)	Continuation W/E	Continuation W/E		
		IRG Security Training 28x pax												
	Procurement		Procure Vehicles: 1x Coaster, 2x Hilux, 1x Ranger & 1x Box Truck							Vehicles Arrive				
	Dev Milestones		Procure Eqpt: 2x TM60, 2x AC Unit, 2x Generator, 1x ISO, Rifles, Ammo, PPE & Pers Kit							Equipment Arrive				
								All Tpr WHT/ LETT(-)/Tactics						
2027	Decision Point		Authority to Recruit Reg & Res											
	Reg Recruitment				Recruit Reg Staff (1x local)				Reg Staff Onbarded (local)					
	Res Recruitment				Recruit Res Staff (33x local)		Sift Applications	Assess / Select Res Staff						
	Training	CCS (3x OCdt) (or Jun/Jul)		Offr Continuation Trg (Ph2) - Security TTPs	JNCO Cadre (3x W/E)					Recruit Training (33x Tpr, 16x days Residential)	Continuation W/E	Continuation W/E		
		IRG Security Training (28x pax)												
	Procurement		Procure Vehicles: 1x TCV & 2x Hilux							Vehicles Arrive				
	Dev Milestones		Procure Eqpt: Ammo, PPE & Pers Kit							Equipment Arrive			IRG @ FOC	

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